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Modern mainstream economics is a plurocracy in which there is no orthodoxy of ideas, 
only an orthodoxy of method. Given the training it provides its students, mainstream 
economic’s natural domain is science. With the mainstream’s acceptance of complexity 
views of the economy, Austrian economist’s views can now get a hearing within the 
mainstream. Thus, within the science of economics, there is no need for a separate 
Austrian economics. However, there is a need for Austrian economics in political 
economy, that branch of economics that takes the insights of science and relates them to 
policy. The paper urges Austrian economics to embrace political economy as its domain, 
and to position its work as within political economy.  The Domain of Austrian Economics 
Dave Colander, Middlebury College 
  When Roger asked me for a title, my natural thought was The Death of Austrian 
Economics—after all since I killed off neoclassical economics, (Colander, 2000) was life 
still worth living for Austrian economics? But Austrian economic has died so many 
times, and has always risen again, we decided that a better title was “The Domain of 
Austrian” economics. To have a domain, you can’t be dead, so by choosing that title I am 
implicitly taking the position that Austrian economics should continue to exist and not be 
integrated into the “new mainstream plurodoxy” that I believe describes the 
methodological position of mainstream economics in the first decade of the 21 century, as 
I have argued should happen to almost all other organized heterodox groups. (See 
Colander, forthcoming-a) By plurodoxy, I mean a mainstream that has no orthodoxy, 
neooclassical or other. It is a mainstream composed of many different competing beliefs 
and research programs, including an “inside-the-mainstream” heterodoxy. Roger Koppl 
has nicely captured the many views with his BRICE paper. (Koppl, 2006 )  
  I am not arguing that mainstream economics is open and that anything goes—far 
from it. All research programs are sociologically closed as insiders develop methods to 
protect their rents, but once inside, there is no orthodoxy of ideas that one has to follow. 
Modern mainstream economics protects its rents through an orthodoxy of method. 
Modern economics considers itself a science and has its version of a scientific method—
you model, you quantify, and you stay in a fairly narrow set of methodological 
approaches. Because, in truth, modern economics often falls far short of scientific 
standards, it often tries to make up for that failing by focusing on work that is technically 
difficult, even when that technical difficulty is not especially helpful. But all economists 
face the same requirement, so it is not closed to any ideas on ideological grounds.
1 So my 
argument is that modern economics is a plurodoxy limited by method, not by ideas or 
views, which means that Austrian ideas can get a hearing within the mainstream.  
The Problem with Heterodoxy Characterization 
  To argue that Austrian economics has a domain, and should continue as a distinct 
group is a concession for me, since in my other work (Colander, 1998, 2003), I’ve argued 
against the use of classifications of subgroups of heterodox economists except as 
temporary crutches for incoming students and lay people who need oversimplified 
characterizations of views as an entrée into the debates. Thus, I’ve argued that all such 
characterizations of subgroups of economists—Austrian, Keynesian, Classical, Post 
Keynesian, feminist, Institutionalist, behavioral-- should be fleeting. I’ve further argued 
that the characterization should change over time because the debates change. Often, as 
soon as one specifies what is Austrian, Post Keynesian, or Institutionalist, about Austrian, 
Post Keynesian, or Institutionalist, that specification is likely to change. The reason for 
this fleeting nature of classification is that the views held by economists are fleeting, and 
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have to be understood in juxtaposition to other views being expressed at the time; their 
views have little meaning out of context of the debates that lead to the terms in the first 
place. As we argued in Colander, Holt and Rosser (2004) the economics profession is 
best thought of as a complex emerging system that cannot usefully be characterized by 
static names and concepts. You can use classifiers, but as soon as people start thinking 
that the classifier defines them, it become counterproductive.  
  The problem with any self-characterization of a view or group is that self 
characterizations tends to become institutionalized—it leads to separate organizations and 
journals that define and confine the conversation of this subgroup of economists. The 
group members communicate among themselves, and not with other heterodox groups or 
with mainstream economist. The self characterization pulls them out of the mainstream 
plurodoxy. Put another way, self-classification leads people to become heterodox.  
  The creation of such subgroups defined by self-characterization is often highly 
satisfying for the creators of these subgroups; it creates a small pond where one can be a 
big fish. This happens especially when the group establishes educational institutional 
beachheads and begins training their own students. As X students come in and study and 
dissect the works of X economists, often in excruciating detail, the first movers in X have 
the wonderful pleasure of having someone read and care about what they said—a result 
that tends to be important in an academic’s utility functions. Thus, the creation of groups 
leads to protected domains where ideas aren’t subjected to the competitive pressures that 
they would in the mainstream plurodoxy.  
  As pleasurable as it is to be a big fish in a small pond, it is not a good strategy for 
spreading one’s ideas. Important ideas generally take multiple generations of scholars to 
develop, and unless the X group can develop institutions to compete with mainstream 
institutions, they stop progressing and become inbred. The group’s ideas become 
heirloom ideas that do well in a protective heterodox bubble, but which cannot stay alive 
outside the bubble. Unless X group can provide an institutional structure that creates a 
replicator dynamics that expands the number of jobs available for its graduates, its ideas 
will not spread beyond the bubble.  
  Too specialized training in a subdivision leads to graduates who can exist only at 
the edge of the mainstream, and in environments that have protective bubbles. Because 
their training is different, they find that their learning is of little interest to mainstream 
economists; they lack the ability to communicate with those mainstream economists, and 
hence their views do not get a hearing. This is especially difficult because the field of 
economics is an evolving complex system, and what made the aging heterodox 
economists relevant in their youth often is of far less relevance in their middle age or old 
age.  
  It is for these reasons that I argue (Colander, forthcoming-a) that heterodox 
organizations should be seen as incubators that give new ideas a chance to develop to the 
point at which they can be put out into the mainstream—to live of die. Most will die, 
because the competition is very strong in the mainstream, but a few may live, and those 
that do may well establish a foothold in the mainstream plurodoxy. What I believe must The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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be guarded against with any self-characterized subgroup is allowing the incubator to 
become the environment.  
It is Time to Declare Victory and Leave 
  With that introduction, let me turn to my outside view of Austrian economics, and 
what I see as its domain. When I first was introduced to Austrian economics, which 
involved reading Lachmann, Hayek, Yeager, and Kirzner back in graduate school, I was 
impressed. I thought they had some neat ideas. They were certainly more insightful and 
thoughtful than much of the mainstream work that I was reading. I felt that clearly they 
were on to something that I wasn’t getting in my classes. Thus, I was extremely 
sympathetic to Austrian ideas.  
As I came to know Austrian economists a bit better, it became clear to me that I 
was far too eclectic in both my policy and theoretical views to be an Austrian. I also 
learned that Austrians were far from homogeneous, and within the subgroup of Austrian 
economics there were more sub-sub groups than I could keep track of in my head. I found 
myself most comfortable with that subset of Austrians who saw it as necessary to 
separate out analytics from their pro-market ideology, which led other Austrians to 
question whether they were truly Austrian. I urged this group to reach out to other 
heterodox groups of all varieties and concentrate on analytic criticisms of economics that 
transcended ideology, because that was the only way that I felt that they would be taken 
seriously be the mainstream.
2  
  But, as I said above, economics is a complex emerging system, and the problem 
faced by Austrian economics today is different from the problem faced by economists of 
the 1970s. Today, the problem facing all heterodox groups, Austrians included, is that 
much of what they were fighting against no longer exists, if it ever did exist. Any 
orthodoxy that may have existed back in the 1970s has been replaced by a mainstream 
plurocracy. All ideas, if expressed in an acceptable methodological form, now can get a 
hearing. Thus, the key analytic point that I took from Austrian economics was that any 
meaningful consideration of the economy must treat it for the complex system that it is.
3 
Today, it can be treated as such with the mainstream. That complexity war has been won, 
at least on the cutting edge of economics.
4 While there is likely another 20 years of 
mopping up to do, as the stragglers are brought in, there is today an acceptance that 
considering the economy as a complex system is a legitimate scientific approach. 
  There is an irony and injustice here. Even though Austrians have won, its writings 
will not be given any accolades because, in the mainstream vision of the history of 
                                                 
2 I’m pleased that that group has been successful, and through the efforts of economists such a Peter 
Boettke and Roger Koppl, Austrian economics has played an important role in maintaining a heterodox 
presence in the US, and has kept them from being seen as just pro-market ideologs. 
3 The argument that complexity is the central Austrian insight is, of course debatable. I say that because I 
believe that once one accepts that the economy is a complex system, one is naturally led to the other 
elements of the economy that Austrians have emphasized, such as the knowledge problem, 
entrepreneurship, and the limits of mathematics in understanding a complex system such as the economy.  
4 In fighting wars, I should admit that I’m from Vermont and am prone to the George Aiken “declare 
victory and leave” solution to wars. The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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economic thought, the scientific war was won on the technical front—not on the 
conceptual front. The complexity war was won by bringing in the Calvary—ultra 
mathematicians and natural philosophers who were not in the hold of any mainstream 
economics orthodoxy that tended to dominant the profession in the 1970s. This 
mathematical cavalry brought in new analytic and computing techniques. The debate 
about complexity has now moved on to a highly technical battlefield, and the debate 
concerns whether any of these new analytic techniques shed sufficient light on economic 
problems to warrant the greater technical sophistication they require, or whether the best 
we can hope for is an algorithmic understanding of reality. (Vellupia, 2008) The jury is 
still out on that, but it is a debate that really has little to do with the Austrian economists 
that I know. Non-linear dynamics, measure theory, and ultrametrics are not Austrian 
economist’s natural domain. Studying Hayek, Lachman, von Mises or Rothbard is not 
going to prepare one for that mathematical battle.  
  Some Austrians may well make contributions in this area, but if they do, I suspect 
that it will not be because of their Austrian training. For example, say I asked a graduate 
student at George Mason to explain to me what Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas Sargent 
meant in their introductory graduate macro text (first chapter) by the “spectral density 
matrix and the Fourier transform of the covariogram of a covariant stationary stochastic 
process”? My suspicion is that I’d get a blank stare.  
  My point is that to take part in this mainstream scientific debate, you need to 
know the tools and techniques and the mainstream argument better than do the top 
mainstream economists. Only such people will have their complaints taken seriously. 
Barkley Rosser and Buz Brock can take part in that debate, but I, and most Austrians, 
cannot. The Austrian programs that I know don’t provide students the technical 
sophistication to take a meaningful part in that debate, and their students don’t have the 
proclivity to acquire that technical sophistication. So unless they team up with 
mathematicians or physicists, I see little future for as a distinct entity in Austrian 
economic science. It is time to leave the protective science bubble.  
  My conclusion then is that the Austrian heterodox scientific research programs is 
unsustainable, and should declare victory, and essentially merge into the mainstream. It 
should not distinguish itself with separate graduate programs or maintain a separate 
conversation, trying to teach Austrian economic science.
5 Science is now the 
mainstream’s domain, and Austrians don’t have the mathematical firepower to fight in 
that domain.
6  
                                                 
5 The Austrian classification here could be replaced by Institutionalist, Post Keynesian, or a variety of other 
heterodox classifiers.  
6 As I suggested above, one could argue that mathematics is not the appropriate language for science, but I 
believe that argument is wrong (assuming that my mathematics one means a wide range of formal logical 
argumentation that involves carefully specified techniques that are designed to arrive at as precise answers 
as one can, and not more precise) Thus, it includes work such as Vellupia (2008) or Wolfram (2002). If 
Austrians want to argue against the use of such a broad interpretation of mathematics as the language of 
science, it places them in opposition to not only economics, but the broader scientific community, which is 
why I consider it a loosing argument as well.  The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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The March of Dimes Problem 
  My advice to most other heterodox groups has stopped there, and I have 
encouraged them to become an “inside the mainstream” gorilla economists—working 
within the mainstream while maintaining the ideas and beliefs. Being a gorilla economist 
inside the profession is a much harder life than is life in the protective bubble of 
heterodoxy, but my sense was that it would be more effective for the heterodox 
movement. That’s why my first inclination in this paper was to kill off Austrian 
economics—not to end their ideas, but to spread them throughout the mainstream 
profession, and get them out of their protective bubble. But I’m not arguing that because, 
among all heterodox groups, Austrians have been the most institutionally successful.  
The success of Austrian economics leaves it with what I call the March of Dimes 
Problem: What do you do if you have a viable institutional organization and you win.
7 
One solution is to disband, but that is hard--organizations acquire a life of their own—
they create rents, recognition, and power to those in the organization, and rational people 
work hard to maintain those rents. So the question is: What to do with these organizations 
if you are not disbanding them. The answer is that you get a new domain. By domain, I 
mean what topics it considers under its purview.  
Since I’ve already said that the science of economics should no longer be 
considered under the purview of Austrian economics, some of you may be thinking that 
I’m being illogical. But I’m not, because there is much more to economics than science. 
Specifically, there is the domain of political economy, a branch of economics that relates 
the insights of economic theory with both the normative goals of society and the real 
world institutions within which policy must be applied. Whereas science avoids 
normative and real world institutional issues, political economy embraces them, and 
guides society in implementing economic ideas.  
  Thus my advice to Austrian economists is to formally declare that your domain is 
political economy, not economic science, and that your do it with flare and gusto. Be “in 
your face” with the mainstream, giving them the science domain of economics, but 
fighting for every inch of the policy domain of economics. The reason I advise this is that 
political economy is a domain where Austrian economists have much greater skills than 
those in the mainstream. It is a domain where Austrian economists have a chance of 
winning.  
Economic Science and Political Economy 
  Since the term, political economy, has many different meanings, I should be a bit 
more explicit about what I mean. Let me start by what I do not mean. I do not mean much 
of the work that currently goes under the name political economy—work that adds 
political variables to empirical models. In my view most of that work is at best game 
                                                 
7 The March of Dimes was a charity devoted to fighting polio. When polio was eradicated, it had to either 
go out of existence or choose a new target. It chose to fight premature death, infant mortality and birth 
defects, three problems that are highly unlikely to ever be solved, thereby preserving its long term 
existence.  The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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playing—creating arbitrarily defined concepts and relating them to other concepts in 
ways that provide little understanding or insight. Instead, I mean by political economy is 
what Lionel Robbins meant by political economy—that branch of the field of economics 
that is explicitly concerned with policy.  
  Since Robbins views have been seriously misunderstood by the profession, let me 
briefly explain.
8 In his famous work on method (Robbins, 1932) in which he defined 
economics, Robbins was clear that he was defining economic science, not the entire field 
of economics. Robbins interpreted economic science, like classical economists before 
him, very narrowly; it had to have no value judgments; and no speculation. Before 
something would become part of the knowledge of economic science it had to be 
indisputable by a trained economist. Since all policy was not indisputable for Robbins 
economic science had essentially nothing to say about policy. He wrote “In the present 
state of knowledge, the man who can claim for economic science much exactitude is a 
quack.” (1938).
9  
  Robbins’ methodological prescription was that value judgments (which included 
interpersonal welfare comparisons, but went far beyond them) had no place in economic 
science. That prescription has been seriously misunderstood by the profession, which 
interpreted it as meaning that value judgments had no place in economics. He specifically 
did not say that. All Robbins said is that economists should not use value judgments in 
their role as scientists. He specifically said that they should use value judgments in their 
in their role as economists. He knew that to make policy prescriptions one had to make 
value judgments. His point was that you don’t draw policy from science—you draw it 
from political economy, using scientific knowledge as one input, but only one input. 
Thus, if you were saying anything about policy, you were not being an economic 
scientist; you were being a political economist. In his Ely Lecture, he is very explicit 
about this. He writes:  
My suggestion here, as in the Introduction to my Political Economy: Past and 
Present, is that its (political economy) use should be revived as now covering that 
part of our sphere of interest which essentially involves judgments of value. 
Political Economy, thus conceived, is quite unashamedly concerned with the 
assumptions of policy and the results flowing from them. I may say that this is not 
(repeat not) a recent habit of mine. In the Preface to my Economic Planning and 
International Order, published in 1937, I describe it as “essentially an essay in 
what may be called Political economy as distinct from Economics in the stricter 
sense of the word. It depends upon the technical apparatus of analytical 
Economics; but it applies this apparatus to the examination of schemes for the 
realization of aims whose formulation lies outside Economics; and it does not 
abstain from appeal to the probabilities of political practice when such an appeal 
has seemed relevant. (Robbins, 1981, 8)  
                                                 
8 A more extensive discussion can be found in Colander (forthcoming-b) 
9 In Robbins’ time that meant that economic science was only concerned with deductive work since the 
empirical tools were very rudimentary, and didn’t allow much testing of theories, but more recently has 
expanded to include empirical work. Thus, I argue that Robbins would change his definition of economics, 
were he around today. The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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  In Robbins’ time economists could reasonably focus on both political economy 
and economic science, but today that is harder. Technological developments have 
increased the need for specialization. Today good economic science requires a highly 
specialized technical training—a training that generally precludes training in the nuances 
of value judgments and sensibilities that are needed to be a good political economist. 
Either students learn such nuances and sensibilities on their own, or they don’t learn 
them. This leads to over simplistic discussion of policy and all types of embarrassing 
pedestrian discussions of policy by top scientific economists.  
The problem occurs on both side of the political spectrum. For example we have 
macro scientists, V. V. Chari and Patrick Kehoe (2006) arguing that modern 
macroeconomic theory tells us that “discretionary (macro) policy making has only costs 
and no benefits, so that if government policymakers can be made to commit to a policy 
rule, society should make them do so.” (pp 7-8) Similarly, we have economists arguing 
that economic theory tells us that the existence of externalities implies that we need 
government intervention. Both are equally wrong, and both statements make a well-
trained political economist cringe. Economic theory tells us nothing about policy. 
Accepting Robbins’ distinction means that much of what currently goes under the 
name applied policy work combines scientific techniques with policies in unacceptable 
ways, either by giving too much weight to quantitative measures, without discussion, or 
crossing the line and seeming to provide scientific foundations for normative judgments. 
Trying to draw policy conclusions from scientific models reflects a lack of understanding 
of the limits of science, which Hayek nicely explained in The Sensory Order (Hayek, 
1952). The entire welfare economics approach of modern economics, which attempts to 
draw policy conclusions from deductive models is, in Robbins’s framework, misplaced. 
Attempts to get around Robbins’ concerns, such as the new and the new new 
welfare economics have made the problem worse, not better. For a true follower of 
Robbins welfare economics belongs totally in the domain of political economy not 
economic science. Seen within the domain of political economy, welfare economics is 
sorely lacking. In terms of developing an analysis of policy the true follower of Robbins 
was Coase, and what the economics profession sorely needs is an alternative Robbins-
Coasian policy economics developed within the political economy domain, not within the 
science of economics domain. Austrian economists should be on the forefront of 
developing that alternative policy domain.  
Differentiating Political Economy from Economic Science 
  The reason differentiating economic science training from political economy 
training is important is that the methodologies for both are fundamentally different. As I 
discussed in Colander (2008) the methodology for economic science is highly technical 
and requires what I call a producer’s knowledge of the latest developments in 
mathematics, along with a highly creative mind, and the latest developments in statistical 
techniques. Graduate schools now attempt to train students to be producers of scientific 
knowledge. That makes sense for training economic scientists. It doesn’t make sense for 
training political economists. Scientific training does not prepare economists to handle The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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the subtleties of applying scientific knowledge to policy. That involves a quite different 
type of training—and it would be that different type of training that graduate schools in 
political economy would provide. Graduate programs in political economy would have a 
fundamentally different type of training than economics students currently get. They 
would train students to be consumers of the science of economics and in how to apply 
those insights to policy.  
  The reason it would be a different training is that a political economist does not 
require a producer’s understanding of the latest developments in mathematics or 
statistical techniques, just a consumer’s understanding. By that I mean that it would have 
a Charles Kindleberger, Leland Yeager, or Charles Goodhart understanding of economic 
theory. They may not have produced the latest theories, but I would turn to these writers, 
not to most producers of modern theory, when I am trying to determine whether the 
scientific theories are relevant to policy. 
A political economist has to know how ideas developed; he or she has to know 
theory, but they also have to know institutions, political philosophy, and moral 
philosophy. A political economist would be trained in the philosophical foundations of 
policy—he or she would know how ethics interrelates with policy and would have a 
broad knowledge of both past economic literature and economic institutions. 
  A political economist would also be trained in a different type of argumentation. 
That argumentation would not be scientific (proof, lemma, theorem) but rather 
lawyerlike, by which I mean that the political economist would be trained to weigh the 
evidence, and after weighing the evidence how to develop the most persuasive case he or 
she could to show why a particular policy should or should not be followed. The 
argument would include every dimension of the problem that is important to the 
conclusion. In political economy one can assume nothing away because of tractability 
problems.  
This need to include all aspects of an argument means that the arguments a 
political economist makes will not be air tight arguments given well specified 
assumptions. Instead they will be convincing arguments given the shared knowledge of 
people he or she is making the argument to. The output of political economy is 
precepts—general rules of thumb to guide policy. The outputs of economic science are 
empirical facts—regularities that one develops inductively--or theorems—deductive 
truths that follow from a well specified model.  
Conclusion 
  Let me conclude with my take-away message. The domain of Austrian economics 
is political economy. That domain should be embraced, and it can only be embraced by 
giving up the scientific domain. Doing so means changing Austrian PhD programs to 
specifically embrace political economy. They should be called political economy 
programs and they should specifically not try to produce economic scientists. Their The Domain of Austrian Economics 
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training in theory should be training the producers a consumer’s knowledge, not a 
producer’s knowledge, of theory.
10  
  Taking control of the political economy domain will not be easy. Mainstream 
economists think that they control the entire domain of economics.   The entire political 
economy field of economics, which was the dominant branch of classical economics, has 
been lost and is now occupied by economic scientists. They think they own it. One 
should be under no illusion that the mainstream economics will let Austrians stake out the 
political economy domain, because in fact, the domain of political economy is by far the 
larger part of the domain of the field of economics.  
Were the mainstream economics to limit itself to the pure science of economics—
which given its current training, it should-- its size would be approximately the same size 
as the field of physics, and its job opportunities would be similar. Graduates of science of 
economics programs would be delighted when they get a post-doc. The reason is that, in 
truth, there isn’t a whole lot of interest in the pure science of economics. Society’s 
interest in economics is mainly in political economy.
11  
My final comment is that if Austrian economics is to establish a foothold in the 
domain of political economy, it will not belong to it alone. An ideological neutral 
political economy would be inhabited by political economists with all kinds of political 
and moral views, some quite anathema to Austrians. If Austrian political economy 
programs only present their moral views, and do not became a forum within which the 
best of all moral views are allowed to interact and compete, these programs will be seen 
as ideologically driven, and not methodologically driven. Being seen as ideologically 
driven will undermine even the potential for success.  
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